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Abstract
We study the relation between a Cournot equilibrium and a Bertrand
equilibrium in an asymmetric duopoly with differentiated goods in which
each firm maximizes its relative profit that is the difference between its profit
and the profit of the rival firm. Both demand and cost functions are linear but
asymmetric, that is, demand functions for the goods are asymmetric and the
firms have different marginal cots. We will show that a Cournot equilibrium
and a Bertrand equilibrium coincide even in an asymmetric duopoly.
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1 Introduction
We study the relation between a Cournot equilibrium and a Bertrand equi-
librium in an asymmetric duopoly with differentiated goods in which each firm
maximizes its relative profit that is the difference between its profit and the profit
of the rival firm. Both demand and cost functions are linear but asymmetric, that
is, demand functions for the goods are asymmetric and the firms have different
marginal costs. We will show that a Cournot equilibrium and a Bertrand equilib-
rium coincide even in an asymmetric duopoly.
In recent years, maximizing relative profit instead of absolute profit has aroused
the interest of economists. From an evolutionary perspective, Schaffer (1989)
demonstrates with a Darwinian model of economic natural selection that if firms
have market power, profit-maximizers are not necessarily the best survivors. Ac-
cording to Schaffer (1989), a unilateral deviation from Cournot equilibrium de-
creases the profit of the deviator, but decreases the other firm's profit even more.
On the condition of being better than other competitors, firms that deviate from
Cournot equilibrium achieve higher payoffs than the payoffs they receive under
Cournot equilibrium. In Vega-Redondo (1997), it is argued that, in a homoge-
neous good case, if firms maximize relative profit, a Walrasian equilibrium can be
induced.
Note that if the goods produced by the firms are homogeneous, relative
profit maximization leads to the competitive output and price (equal
to marginal cost). But in the case of differentiated goods, the results
under relative profit maximization is different from the competitive
result.
For other analyses of relative profit maximization see Lundgren (1996), Kockesen
et. al. (2000), Matsumura, Matsushima and Cato (2013), Gibbons and Murphy
(1990) and Lu (2011).
In another paper Tanaka (2013) we have shown that in a symmetric duopoly
with differentiated goods and linear demand functions when firms maximize rela-
tive profits, a Cournot equilibrium and a Bertrand equilibrium coincide. The result
of this paper is an extension of this result to an asymmetric duopoly.
2 The model and analyses
There are two firms, A and B. They produce differentiated substitutable goods.
Denote the outputs of Firm A and B by, respectively, 𝑥𝐴 and 𝑥𝐵, the prices of the
goods of Firm A and B by, respectively, 𝑝𝐴 and 𝑝𝐵, the marginal costs of Firm A
and B by, respectively, 𝑐𝐴 and 𝑐𝐵. Of course, 𝑐𝐴 > 0 and 𝑐𝐵 > 0. They may be
different. There is no fixed cost.
The inverse demand functions of the goods produced by the firms are
𝑝𝐴 = 𝑎 − 𝑥𝐴 − 𝑏𝐴𝑥𝐵,
and
𝑝𝐵 = 𝑎 − 𝑥𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵𝑥𝐴,
where 𝑎 > 𝑐, 0 < 𝑏𝐴 < 1 and 0 < 𝑏𝐵 < 1. 𝑏𝐴 and 𝑏𝐵 may be different. 𝑥𝐴
represents the demand for the good of Firm A, and 𝑥𝐵 represents the demand for
the good of Firm B. The prices of the goods are determined so that demand of
consumers for each firm's good and supply of each firm are equilibrated.
From these inverse demand functions the following ordinary demand functions
are derived.
𝑥𝐴 =
1
1 − 𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵
[(1 − 𝑏𝐴)𝑎 − 𝑝𝐴 + 𝑏𝐴𝑝𝐵],
and
𝑥𝐵 =
1
1 − 𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵
[(1 − 𝑏𝐵)𝑎 − 𝑝𝐵 + 𝑏𝐵𝑝𝐴].
3.1 Cournot equilibrium
The relative profit of Firm A (or B) is the difference between its profit and the
profit of Firm B (or A). We denote the relative profit of Firm A byΠ𝐴 and that of
Firm B byΠ𝐵. They are written as follows.
Π𝐴 =𝜋𝐴 − 𝜋𝐵 = (𝑎 − 𝑥𝐴 − 𝑏𝐴𝑥𝐵)𝑥𝐴 − (𝑎 − 𝑥𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵𝑥𝐴)𝑥𝐵 − 𝑐𝐴𝑥𝐴 + 𝑐𝐵𝑥𝐵
and
Π𝐵 =𝜋𝐵 − 𝜋𝐴 = (𝑎 − 𝑥𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵𝑥𝐴)𝑥𝐵 − (𝑎 − 𝑥𝐴 − 𝑏𝐴𝑥𝐵)𝑥𝐴 − 𝑐𝐵𝑥𝐵 + 𝑐𝐴𝑥𝐴
Each firm determines its output given the output of the rival firm so as to maximize
its relative profit. The condition for relative profit maximization of Firm A is
𝑎 − 𝑐𝐴 − 2𝑥𝐴 − (𝑏𝐴 − 𝑏𝐵)𝑥𝐵 = 0. (1)
Similarly the condition for relative profit maximization of Firm B is
𝑎 − 𝑐𝐵 − 2𝑥𝐵 − (𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐴)𝑥𝐴 = 0. (2)
Then, the equilibrium outputs of Firm A and B are derived as follows.
̃𝑥𝐶𝐴 =
(2 − 𝑏𝐴 + 𝑏𝐵)𝑎 − 2𝑐𝐴 + (𝑏𝐴 − 𝑏𝐵)𝑐𝐵
4 + (𝑏𝐴 − 𝑏𝐵)2
, (3)
and
̃𝑥𝐶𝐵 =
(2 − 𝑏𝐵 + 𝑏𝐴)𝑎 − 2𝑐𝐵 + (𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐴)𝑐𝐴
4 + (𝑏𝐴 − 𝑏𝐵)2
. (4)
The equilibrium prices of the goods of Firm A and B are
̃𝑝𝐶𝐴 =
(2 − 𝑏𝐴 − 𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 + 𝑏2𝐵)𝑎 + (2 − 𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 + 𝑏2𝐴)𝑐𝐴 + (𝑏𝐴 + 𝑏𝐵)𝑐𝐵
4 + (𝑏𝐴 − 𝑏𝐵)2
, (5)
and
̃𝑝𝐶𝐵 =
(2 − 𝑏𝐴 − 𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 + 𝑏2𝐴)𝑎 + (2 − 𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 + 𝑏2𝐵)𝑐𝐵 + (𝑏𝐴 + 𝑏𝐵)𝑐𝐴
4 + (𝑏𝐴 − 𝑏𝐵)2
. (6)
About calculations of (3)∼(6) see Appendix A.
3.2 Bertrand equilibrium
The relative profits of Firm A and B are also denoted by Π𝐴 and Π𝐵. Using
the ordinary demand functions, they are written as follows.
Π𝐴 = 𝜋𝐴 − 𝜋𝐵 =
1
1 − 𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵
[(1 − 𝑏𝐴)𝑎 − 𝑝𝐴 + 𝑏𝐴𝑝𝐵](𝑝𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴)
− 11 − 𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵
[(1 − 𝑏𝐵)𝑎 − 𝑝𝐵 + 𝑏𝐵𝑝𝐴](𝑝𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵),
and
Π𝐵 = 𝜋𝐵 − 𝜋𝐴 =
1
1 − 𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵
[(1 − 𝑏𝐵)𝑎 − 𝑝𝐵 + 𝑏𝐵𝑝𝐴](𝑝𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵)
− 11 − 𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵
[(1 − 𝑏𝐴)𝑎 − 𝑝𝐴 + 𝑏𝐴𝑝𝐵](𝑝𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴).
Each firm determines the price of its good given the price of the rival firm's good
so as to maximize its relative profit.
The condition for relative profit maximization of Firm A is
(1 − 𝑏𝐴)𝑎 − 2𝑝𝐴 + 𝑏𝐴𝑝𝐵 + 𝑐𝐴 − 𝑏𝐵(𝑝𝐵 − 𝑐𝐵) = 0.
And the condition for relative profit maximization of Firm B is
(1 − 𝑏𝐵)𝑎 − 2𝑝𝐵 + 𝑏𝐵𝑝𝐴 + 𝑐𝐵 − 𝑏𝐴(𝑝𝐴 − 𝑐𝐴) = 0.
Substituting the inverse demand functions into them and arranging the terms, we
obtain
−(𝑎 − 2𝑥𝐴 − 𝑏𝐴𝑥𝐵 − 𝑐𝐴 + 𝑏𝐵𝑥𝐵) − 𝑏𝐵(𝑎 − 2𝑥𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵𝑥𝐴 − 𝑐𝐵 + 𝑏𝐴𝑥𝐴) = 0,
and
−(𝑎 − 2𝑥𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵𝑥𝐴 − 𝑐𝐵 + 𝑏𝐴𝑥𝐴) − 𝑏𝐴(𝑎 − 2𝑥𝐴 − 𝑏𝐴𝑥𝐵 − 𝑐𝐴 + 𝑏𝐵𝑥𝐵) = 0.
Since 0 < 𝑏𝐴 < 1 and 0 < 𝑏𝐵 < 1, these equations imply
𝑎 − 2𝑥𝐴 − 𝑏𝐴𝑥𝐵 − 𝑐𝐴 + 𝑏𝐵𝑥𝐵 = 0,
and
𝑎 − 2𝑥𝐵 − 𝑏𝐵𝑥𝐴 − 𝑐𝐵 + 𝑏𝐴𝑥𝐴 = 0.
They are identical to the conditions for relative profit maximization at the Cournot
equilibrium in (1) and (2). Therefore, the equilibrium outputs of Firm A and B are
obtained as follows.
̃𝑥𝐵𝐴 =
(2 − 𝑏𝐴 + 𝑏𝐵)𝑎 − 2𝑐𝐴 + (𝑏𝐴 − 𝑏𝐵)𝑐𝐵
4 + (𝑏𝐴 − 𝑏𝐵)2
,
and
̃𝑥𝐵𝐵 =
(2 − 𝑏𝐵 + 𝑏𝐴)𝑎 − 2𝑐𝐵 + (𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐴)𝑐𝐴
4 + (𝑏𝐴 − 𝑏𝐵)2
.
And the equilibrium prices of the goods of Firm A and B are
̃𝑝𝐵𝐴 =
(2 − 𝑏𝐴 − 𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 + 𝑏2𝐵)𝑎 + (2 − 𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 + 𝑏2𝐴)𝑐𝐴 + (𝑏𝐴 + 𝑏𝐵)𝑐𝐵
4 + (𝑏𝐴 − 𝑏𝐵)2
,
and
̃𝑝𝐵𝐵 =
(2 − 𝑏𝐴 − 𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 + 𝑏2𝐴)𝑎 + (2 − 𝑏𝐴𝑏𝐵 + 𝑏2𝐵)𝑐𝐵 + (𝑏𝐴 + 𝑏𝐵)𝑐𝐴
4 + (𝑏𝐴 − 𝑏𝐵)2
.
We have
̃𝑥𝐶𝐴 = ̃𝑥𝐵𝐴, ̃𝑝𝐶𝐴 = ̃𝑝𝐵𝐴,
and
̃𝑥𝐶𝐵 = ̃𝑥𝐵𝐵, ̃𝑝𝐶𝐵 = ̃𝑝𝐵𝐵.
Thus, in an asymmetric duopoly with linear demand functions the Cournot equilib-
rium and the Bertrand equilibrium are equivalent under relative profit maximiza-
tion in the sense that the equilibrium outputs and prices at the Cournot equilibrium
and those at the Bertrand equilibrium are equal.
4 Interpretation
The result of this paper implies that when firms seek to maximize their relative
profits, distinction of price competition and quantity competition in duopoly does
not make sense.
A game of relative profit maximization in duopoly is interpreted as a two-
person zero-sum game with two sets of strategic variables. Consider an example
of two-person zero-sum game as follows. There are two players, A and B. They
have two sets of strategic variables, (𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) and (𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵). The relations of them are
represented by
𝑠𝐴 = 𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵), and 𝑠𝐵 = 𝑓𝐵(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵).
𝑓𝐴 and 𝑓𝐵 are assumed to be linear, so 𝜕𝑓𝐴𝜕𝑡𝐴 ,
𝜕𝑓𝐴
𝜕𝑡𝐵 ,
𝜕𝑓𝐵
𝜕𝑡𝐴 and
𝜕𝑓𝐵
𝜕𝑡𝐵 are constant. We assumethat the payoff function of Player A is the following quadratic function.
𝑢𝐴 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐴𝑠2𝐴 + 𝛽𝐵𝑠2𝐵 + 𝛾𝑠𝐴𝑠𝐵 + 𝛿𝐴𝑠𝐴 + 𝛿𝐵𝑠𝐵.
𝛼, 𝛽𝐴, 𝛽𝐵, 𝛾, 𝛿𝐴 and 𝛿𝐵 are constants. The payoff function of Player B is 𝑢𝐵 =
−𝑢𝐴. The condition for maximization of 𝑢𝐴 with respect to 𝑠𝐴 and the condition
for maximization of 𝑢𝐵 with respect to 𝑠𝐵 are
2𝛽𝐴𝑠𝐴 + 𝛾𝑠𝐵 + 𝛿𝐴 = 0, (7)
and
2𝛽𝐵𝑠𝐵 + 𝛾𝑠𝐴 + 𝛿𝐵 = 0. (8)
We assume the existence of the maximums of 𝑢𝐴 and 𝑢𝐵. Substituting 𝑓𝐴 and 𝑓𝐵
into 𝑢𝐴 and 𝑢𝐵 yields
𝑢𝐴 = 𝛼+𝛽𝐴[𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵)]2+𝛽𝐵[𝑓𝐵(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵)]2+𝛾𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵)𝑓𝐵(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵)+𝛿𝐴𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵)+𝛿𝐵𝑓𝐵(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵).
Since 𝑓𝐴 and 𝑓𝐵 are linear, 𝑢𝐴 and 𝑢𝐵 are quadratic with respect to 𝑡𝐴 and 𝑡𝐵. The
condition for maximization of 𝑢𝐴 with respect to 𝑡𝐴 and the condition for maxi-
mization of 𝑢𝐵 with respect to 𝑡𝐵 are
2𝛽𝐴𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵)
𝜕𝑓𝐴
𝜕𝑡𝐴
+ 2𝛽𝐵𝑓𝐵(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵)
𝜕𝑓𝐵
𝜕𝑡𝐴
+ 𝛾𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵)
𝜕𝑓𝐵
𝜕𝑡𝐴
+ 𝛾𝑓𝐵(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵)
𝜕𝑓𝐴
𝜕𝑡𝐴
+ 𝛿𝐴
𝜕𝑓𝐴
𝜕𝑡𝐴
+ 𝛿𝐵
𝜕𝑓𝐵
𝜕𝑡𝐴
= 0,
and
2𝛽𝐴𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵)
𝜕𝑓𝐴
𝜕𝑡𝐵
+ 2𝛽𝐵𝑓𝐵(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵)
𝜕𝑓𝐵
𝜕𝑡𝐵
+ 𝛾𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵)
𝜕𝑓𝐵
𝜕𝑡𝐵
+ 𝛾𝑓𝐵(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵)
𝜕𝑓𝐴
𝜕𝑡𝐵
+ 𝛿𝐴
𝜕𝑓𝐴
𝜕𝑡𝐵
+ 𝛿𝐵
𝜕𝑓𝐵
𝜕𝑡𝐵
= 0.
They are rewritten as
[2𝛽𝐴𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵) + 𝛾𝑓𝐵(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵) + 𝛿𝐴]
𝜕𝑓𝐴
𝜕𝑡𝐴
(9)
+ [2𝛽𝐵𝑓𝐵(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵) + 𝛾𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵) + 𝛿𝐵]
𝜕𝑓𝐵
𝜕𝑡𝐴
= 0,
and
[2𝛽𝐴𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵) + 𝛾𝑓𝐵(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵) + 𝛿𝐴]
𝜕𝑓𝐴
𝜕𝑡𝐵
(10)
+ [2𝛽𝐵𝑓𝐵(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵) + 𝛾𝑓𝐴(𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵) + 𝛿𝐵]
𝜕𝑓𝐵
𝜕𝑡𝐵
= 0.
Under the assumption that 𝜕𝑓𝐴𝜕𝑡𝐴
𝜕𝑓𝐵
𝜕𝑡𝐵 −
𝜕𝑓𝐴
𝜕𝑡𝐵
𝜕𝑓𝐵
𝜕𝑡𝐴 ≠ 0, (9) and (10) are equivalent to(7) and (8). Therefore, competition by (𝑠𝐴, 𝑠𝐵) and competition by (𝑡𝐴, 𝑡𝐵) are
equivalent.
Assuming 𝑠𝐴 = 𝑥𝐴, 𝑠𝐵 = 𝑥𝐵, 𝑡𝐴 = 𝑝𝐴, 𝑡𝐵 = 𝑝𝐵, 𝛼 = 0, 𝛾 = 𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐴, 𝛽𝐴 = −1,
𝛽𝐵 = 1, 𝛿𝐴 = 𝑎 − 𝑐𝐴, 𝛿𝐵 = −𝑎 + 𝑐𝐵, 𝑓𝐴 and 𝑓𝐵 be the ordinary demand functions,
we obtain the model of this paper.
We plan to generalize discussions of this paper to a case of general demand
and cost functions,
Appendix: Calculations of (3)∼(6)
From the condition for relative profit maximization of Firm B in the Cournot
equilibrium
𝑥𝐵 =
1
2[𝑎 − 𝑐𝐵 + (𝑏𝐴 − 𝑏𝐵)𝑥𝐴]
Substituting this into the condition for relative profitmaximization of FirmAyields
𝑎 − 𝑐𝐴 − 2𝑥𝐴 −
𝑏𝐴 − 𝑏𝐵
2 [𝑎 − 𝑐𝐵 + (𝑏𝐴 − 𝑏𝐵)𝑥𝐴] = 0
Rearranging the terms,
[4 + (𝑏𝐴 − 𝑏𝐵)2]𝑥𝐴 = 2𝑎 − 2𝑐𝐴 − (𝑏𝐴 − 𝑏𝐵)(𝑎 − 𝑐𝐵)
Then, we get (3). Calculation of (4) is similar.
From the inverse demand function for the good of Firm A
𝑝𝐴 = 𝑎 − 𝑥𝐴 − 𝑏𝐴𝑥𝐵.
Substituting (3) and (4) into this,
𝑝𝐴 =𝑎 −
(2 − 𝑏𝐴 + 𝑏𝐵)𝑎 − 2𝑐𝐴 + (𝑏𝐴 − 𝑏𝐵)𝑐𝐵
4 + (𝑏𝐴 − 𝑏𝐵)2
− 𝑏𝐴
(2 − 𝑏𝐵 + 𝑏𝐴)𝑎 − 2𝑐𝐵 + (𝑏𝐵 − 𝑏𝐴)𝑐𝐴
4 + (𝑏𝐴 − 𝑏𝐵)2
Then, we get (5). Calculation of (6) is similar.
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